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1 Introduction
We analyse multi-unit auctions where producers submit bids before demand, pro-
duction capacities and production costs are fully known. Our model accounts for
asymmetric information in suppliersproduction costs and considers unexpected
outages and intermittent output, such as those from renewable energy sources.
Our analysis is, for example, of relevance for European wholesale electricity mar-
kets, where the European Commission is introducing regulations on submission
and publication of data to increase the market transparency (EU, 2011;2013). We
are interested in how such regulations and the auction format (uniform or discrim-
inatory pricing) inuence the competitiveness of the resulting market outcomes.
Our results also suggest that the bidding format is of importance for market per-
formance.
In electricity markets, the production costs can, to some extent, be estimated
from engineering data of plants and fuel price indexes. Still, a generation unit
owner has private information about the specic price paid for its quality of fuel
and how a plant is operated in detail. We believe that the cost uncertainty is
largest in hydro-dominated markets. The opportunity cost of using water stored
in a reservoir is estimated from a discounted prognosis of future electricity prices.
The uncertainty in the opportunity cost is to a large extent common for hydro-
power producers, but the uncertainty also has private components such as a pro-
ducers internal risk-adjusted discount rates. If water is scarce and inows are
small, then producers have the possibility to store water for a long period of time,
sometimes several years. In this case, the opportunity cost depends on a pre-
diction of electricity prices several years later, so the uncertainty becomes large.
The uncertainty in the opportunity cost is further exacerbated by political risks,
the possibility of regulatory intervention and producerssubjective probabilities
of such events during the planned storage period.
We consider a multi-unit auction with two producers, where an auctioneer
must buy from both producers when demand is high. Accepted bids are either
paid a uniform or a discriminatory price. In uniform-price procurement auctions,
all accepted bids are paid a uniform clearing price, which is set by the highest
accepted bid (Krishna, 2010). In a discriminatory auction, all accepted bids are
paid their own bid price (Krishna, 2010). The auctioneers demand is uncertain
and realized after bids have been submitted. Similar to von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), each rm makes a sealed bid where it o¤ers its entire production capacity
at one unit price in a one-shot game. In our case, the production capacity could
be realized after bids have been submitted. We also generalize von der Fehr and
Harbord (1993) by introducing uncertain interdependent costs. Analogous to Mil-
grom and Webers (1982) auction model for single objects, each rm makes its
own estimate of production costs based on private imperfect information that it
receives, and then makes a bid.1 As is customary in game theory, we refer to this
private information as a private signal.
1Milgrom and Weber (1982) analyse an analogous sales auction, so in their setting each agent
estimates the value of the good that the auctioneer is selling.
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Similar to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we solve for a symmetric Bayesian NE
and consider signals that are drawn from a non-parametric distribution. Bidding
behaviour depends on the correlation or a¢ liation of signals. A¢ liated signals are
such that if the signal of one player increases, then it increases the probability that
the competitor has a high signal relative to the probability that the competitor
has a low signal.
As in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), our results depend on whether pro-
ducers are pivotal or not. A producer is pivotal if its competitors do not have
enough production capacity to meet the realized demand. Unlike von der Fehr
and Harbord (1993), market prices are higher when producers are pivotal with a
larger margin in our setting. There is one exception in our analysis of the uniform-
price auction, where the market price could decrease when demand increases at
the critical point where producers switch from being non-pivotal to being pivotal.
The reason for this counter-intuitive result is that the price-setting bid switches
from the lowest bid to the highest bid at this critical point, which drastically
changes the bidding behaviour. Bidders are always non-pivotal in single object
auctions with at least two participants, while the number of pivotal producers in
wholesale electricity markets depends on the season and the time-of-day (Genc
and Reynolds, 2011), but also on market shocks. Pivotal supplier indicators are
used in practice to predict market power in electricity markets.
We show that the auctioneer prefers a design with uniform pricing to discriminatory-
pricing when signals are su¢ ciently close to being independent. The advantages
of the uniform-price auction increase when cost uncertainty increases and if bid-
ders are pivotal with a higher probability. This supports the widespread use of
uniform-pricing in wholesale electricity markets.2
We nd that mark-ups decrease if producers receive similar information, i.e.
signals are correlated. This is related to Vives (2011) who nd that mark-ups
would decrease for less noisy cost information. It is also known from previous
work that disclosure of information improves competition in single object auc-
tions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Taken together, these results suggest that
publicly available information of relevance for production costs such as weather
conditions, fuel prices, prices of emission permits improves the market compet-
itiveness. It is also easier for a producer to estimate the production costs of its
competitors if the market operator discloses detailed historical bid data. Thus,
our results indicate that the transparency increasing measures of the European
Commission should improve the performance of European electricity markets. In
addition, information from nancial markets just ahead of the physical markets
would lower the market uncertainty. Trading of long-term contracts helps pro-
ducers predict future electricity prices, which lowers the uncertainty in the oppor-
tunity cost of water. Our results also suggest that political risks are harmful for
competition in hydro dominated markets, especially when water is scarce. Thus,
2Most deregulated wholesale electricity markets use uniform-pricing. Two exceptions are
Britain and Iran, which use discriminatory pricing. In addition, some special auctions in the
electricity market, such as counter-trading in the balancing market and/or the procurement of
power reserves, sometimes use discriminatory pricing (Holmberg and Lazarzcyk, 2015; Anderson
et al., 2013).
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we recommend clearly dened contingency plans for intervention by the market
operator and the regulator under extreme system conditions. This could poten-
tially mitigate the extraordinarily high-priced periods that typically accompany
low water conditions in hydro dominated wholesale electricity markets such as
California, Colombia, and New Zealand.
Increased transparency lowers the payo¤ of producers, which also suggests
that producers would try to conceal their cost estimates from each other. This
has similarities to Gal-Or (1986) who shows that producers that play a Bertrand
equilibrium would try to conceal their costs from each other. According to our
results, increased transparency would only be helpful up to a point, because there
is a lower bound on equilibrium mark-ups when producers are pivotal. Another
caveat is that we only consider a single shot game. As argued by von der Fehr
(2013), there is a risk that increased transparency in European electricity markets
facilitates tacit collusion in a repeated game.
We show that bids in a discriminatory auction are determined by the expected
sales of the highest and lowest bidder, respectively. In our setting, the variance
in these sales after bids have been submitted due to uncertainties in demand,
outages and intermittent renewable production will not inuence the bidding
behaviour of producers in the discriminatory auction. Bidding in the uniform-
price auction is also insensitive to variances, as long as the market shocks are not
su¢ ciently large to occasionally change the pivotal status of at least one producer.
If the pivotal status changes with a positive probability in a uniform-price auction,
then we nd for independent signals that mark-ups increase when there is a higher
probability that producers are pivotal for given expected sales of the highest and
lowest bidder.
Our results depend on the auction design, the demand side, production capac-
ities, the information structure, expected costs and costs for the special case when
information is symmetric. As long as those aspects are unchanged, our results do
not depend on the extent to which the cost uncertainty is private, interdependent
or common. This is quite di¤erent to Vives (2011). The reason is that producers in
his setting choose linear supply functions and can therefore condition their output
on every price. To a larger extent than in our model, his bidding format allows
producers to condition their output on the competitors information. If costs are
common or positively interdependent, a producer therefore has an incentive to
reduce output when the price is unexpectedly high (when the competitor has re-
ceived a high cost signal) and increase the output when the price is unexpectedly
low (when the competitor has received a low cost signal). This will make supply
functions steeper or even downward sloping, which will signicantly harm compe-
tition. If costs are common, mark-ups can be as high as for the collusive outcome
(Vives, 2011). Thus, our results and the results in Vives (2011) indicate that
when the cost uncertainty is common or strongly interdependent, which should
often be the case in wholesale electricity markets, then it should be optimal to
limit the number of allowed steps in producerssupply functions in order to give
producers less freedom to condition their output on competitorssignals. Most
wholesale electricity markets and other multi-units auctions have such constraints
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in the bidding format.
Our study focuses on procurement auctions, but the results are analogous for
divisible-good sales auctions. Purchase constraints in sales auctions correspond
to production capacities in our setting. As an example, U.S. treasury auctions
have the 35% rule, which prevents a single bidder from buying more than 35%
of the sold securities. This is to avoid the outcome where a single bidder corners
the market. On the other hand, the 35% rule increases the risk that a bidder will
be pivotal. To some extent, biddersnancial constraints would also correspond
to production capacities.3 The supply of treasury bills, which corresponds to the
auctioneers demand in our model, is sometimes uncertain when bids are submitted
due to an uncertain amount of non-competitive bids (Wang and Zender, 2002) or
because the auctioneer wants to wait for the latest market news before announcing
its supply of treasury bills. Our results also indicate that the uniform-price format
is preferable. Thus, the U.S. Treasury should have gained from switching from
the discriminatory format to the uniform-price format during the 1990s. Most
other treasury auctions around the world use discriminatory pricing (Bartolini
and Cottarelli, 1997). Our results also suggest that central banks could benet
from disclosing more information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares our paper with the
previous literature. Section 3 formally introduces our model, which is analysed
for auctions with discriminatory and uniform-pricing in Section 4. The paper is
concluded in Section 5. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Comparison with previous studies
Our model is inspired by classical auction theory. In the special case where pro-
ducers are non-pivotal with certainty, our model corresponds to the single object
auction analysed by Milgrom and Weber (1982). Our main methodological contri-
bution is that we generalize their model to the pivotal case, where competitors do
not have enough production capacity to meet all of the auctioneers demand. Our
model also generalizes Parisio and Bosco (2003), which is restricted to producers
with independent private costs in uniform-price auctions.
Divisible-good auctions often have restrictions on howmany bids each producer
can submit or, equivalently, how many steps a producer is allowed to have in its
stepped supply function. In practice, a producer is normally allowed to make
more than the single bid that is considered here and in von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993). However, as shown by Genc (2009) and Anderson et al. (2013), there are
many circumstances in discriminatory auctions where a producer nds it optimal
to o¤er its whole production capacity at one price, and then the equilibrium is
not inuenced by the single-bid restriction. Similar to the extension of a single-
bid model to a multi-bid model by Fabra et al. (2006), we could also argue
that it is enough to solve for the marginal bids of the two producers as long
3Financial constraints of bidders partly explain the bidding behaviour in security auctions.
They are, for example, analysed by Che and Gale (1998).
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as other bids never clear the market, i.e. the uncertainties in the market are
su¢ ciently small. Kastl (2012) and Wolak (2007) have developed empirical models
where each rm submits multiple bids in markets where the market uncertainties
could be large. Ausubel et al. (2014) extend Milgrom and Weber (1982) to
the case with two bids per non-pivotal bidder. This complicates the ranking of
auction formats, so that it becomes ambiguous. Holmberg et al. (2013) solve for
equilibria of stepped supply functions in divisible-good auctions with discrete price
levels. Supply functions with a large number of steps are often approximated by
continuous supply functions (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Wilson, 1979).
Previous models of strategic bidding in wholesale electricity markets normally
focus on demand uncertainties and tend to neglect cost uncertainties (Green and
Newbery, 1992; Anderson and Hu, 2008; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010; von der
Fehr and Harbord, 1993). Vives (2011) is one exception. He considers a bidding
format that is di¤erent from ours, where producers compete with linear supply
functions in a uniform-price auction. Signals are normally distributed in Vives
(2011), while we consider a non-parametric distribution. Rostek and Weretka
(2012) extend Vives(2011) setting to a double auction.
In order to facilitate comparisons with previous studies where the costs are
assumed to be common knowledge, we derive results for the limit where the cost
uncertainty decreases until the costs are almost surely common knowledge. In
this limit, our model of the discriminatory auction corresponds to the classical
Bertrand game. We get the competitive outcome with zero mark-ups for this
limit when non-pivotal producers have weakly a¢ liated signals, both for uniform-
price and discriminatory auctions. This concurs with the competitive outcomes for
non-pivotal producers in the Bertrand game, in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)
and in Fabra et al. (2006). If signals are independent and producers pivotal, it
follows from Harsanyis (1973) purication theorem that in the limit when costs
are almost surely common knowledge, our Bayesian Nash equilibria correspond
to the mixed-strategy NE that Anderson et al. (2013), Anwar (2006), Fabra et
al. (2006), Genc (2009), Son et al. (2004) and von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)
derive for uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.4 Similar mixed strategy NE
also occur in the Bertrand-Edgeworth game (Edgeworth, 1925; Allen and Hellwig,
1986; Beckmann, 1967; Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Maskin, 1986; Vives, 1986).5
As for example illustrated by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), there can be mul-
tiple NE in divisible-good auctions when some bids are never price-setting. This
is not an issue in discriminatory auctions or in our general model of the uniform-
price auction where the pivotal status of bidders changes with a positive probabil-
ity. However, in the special case where producers are pivotal with certainty in a
uniform-price auction, there is another equilibrium, in addition to the symmetric
equilibrium that we calculate. The other equilibrium is asymmetric and was dis-
covered by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). In our discussion, we refer to this as
4Blázquez de Paz (2014) generalizes these mixed-strategy NE to consider transmission con-
straints.
5Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) generalize the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game to a setting with asymmetric costs and asymmetric production capacities,
respectively.
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the high-price equilibrium, because the price-setting producer bids at the highest
possible price (the reservation price). The other producer just bids su¢ ciently low
to deter deviations by the high-price bidder.
In our setting, uniform-pricing and discriminatory pricing are equivalent when
rms are non-pivotal. Fabra et al. (2006) get the same result for costs that are
common knowledge. However, our ranking di¤ers from that of Fabra et al. (2006)
when rms are pivotal with certainty. The reason is that they select the high-
price equilibrium in their analysis of the uniform-price auction, which makes this
auction format very unattractive for an auctioneer. Holmberg (2009) and Hästö
and Holmberg (2006) identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers the pay-
as-bid auction to the uniform-price auction when suppliers have costs that are
common knowledge and o¤er continuous supply functions. Pycia and Woodward
(2015) use a similar model and show that pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions
are revenue equivalent if the auctioneer chooses the reservation price and its supply
of goods optimally.
3 Model
There are two risk-neutral producers in the market. Each producer i 2 f1; 2g
receives a private signal si with imperfect cost information. The joint probability
density  (si; sj) is continuously di¤erentiable and symmetric, so that  (si; sj) 
 (sj; si). Moreover,  (si; sj) > 0 for (si; sj) 2 (s; s) (s; s).6 We say that signals
are weakly a¢ liated when7
 (u; v0)
 (u; v)
  (u
0; v0)
 (u0; v)
; (1)
where v0  v and u0  u. Thus, if the signal of one player increases, then it
(weakly) increases the probability that its competitor has a high signal relative to
the probability that its competitor has a low signal. It can be shown that signals
are weakly a¢ liated if and only if ln (u; v) is supermodular (Krishna, 2010). We
say that signals are weakly una¢ liated when the opposite is true, i.e.
 (u; v0)
 (u; v)
  (u
0; v0)
 (u0; v)
; (2)
where v0  v and u0  u. Note that independent signals are both weakly a¢ liated
and weakly una¢ liated.
We let
F (si) =
Z si
 1
Z 1
 1
 (u; v) dvdu
6We do not require  (si; sj) > 0 at the boundary, but
1(u;s)
(u;s) =
2(s;u)
(s;u) is assumed to be
bounded for u 2 [s; s].
7Milgrom and Weber (1982) call such signals a¢ liated. We write weakly a¢ liated to stress
when the condition is also satised for independent signals.
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denote the marginal distribution, i.e. the unconditional probability that supplier
i receives a signal below si. We let
f (si) = F
0 (si) :
As in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), we consider the case when each rms
marginal cost is constant up to its production capacity constraint eqi. But in our
setting, eqi and marginal costs are uncertain when bids are submitted. The produc-
tion capacities of the two producers could be correlated, but they are symmetric
information and we assume that they are independent of production costs and
signals. Capacities are symmetric ex-ante, so that E [eqi] = E [eqj]. Realized pro-
duction capacities are assumed to be observed by the auctioneer when the market
is cleared.8 Costs are asymmetric information. In practice, a rm would normally
know more about its own cost than about the competitors cost. Firmscosts are
symmetric ex-ante, i.e. ci (si; sj) = cj (si; sj). We assume that
@ci (si; sj)
@si
> 0; (3)
so that a rms marginal cost increases with respect to its own signal. A rms
marginal cost is allowed to decrease somewhat with respect to the competitors
signal, but we require that:
dci (s; s)
ds
 0: (4)
Thus, if both producers would by (coincidence) receive the same signal s, then
a producers marginal cost is increasing with respect to that same signal. The
special case with independent signals and @ci(si;sj)
@sj
= 0 corresponds to the private
independent cost assumption, which is used in the analysis by Parisio and Bosco
(2003). Krishna (2010) is another special case of our model where ci (si; sj) =
cj (si; sj) corresponds to the common cost/value assumption that is often used in
the auction literature.
In our analysis, we frequently refer to the limit where production costs are
almost surely common knowledge. Formally, we dene:
Denition 1 Production costs are almost surely common knowledge when dci(s;s)
ds
=
0 for s 2 [s; s).
As in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), demand can be uncertain D 2 D;D.
It could be correlated with the production capacities, but demand is assumed to
be independent of the production costs and signals. In addition, it is assumed
that all outcomes are such that 0  D  eqi + eqj, so that there is always enough
production capacity to meet the realized demand. As in von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), demand is inelastic up to a reservation price p. Analogous to Milgrom and
8Alternatively, similar to the market design of the Australian wholesale market, producers
could rst choose bid prices and later adjust production capacities at those prices just before
the market is cleared. Anyway, we assume that the reported production capacities are veriable
by the auctioneer, so that bidders cannot choose them strategically.
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Weber (1982), we assume that the reservation price is set at the highest relevant
marginal cost realization, i.e. p = ci (s; s) for i 2 f1; 2g. This assumption can
be motivated by the fact that an auctioneer would lower its procurement cost by
lowering the reservation price whenever p > ci (s; s).
After rms have received their private signals, each rm submits a bid with
one unit price for its whole capacity in a one-shot game. We let pi (si) be the
chosen bid of rm i 2 f1; 2g when it observes the signal si. The auctioneer accepts
bids in order to minimize its procurement cost. In a uniform-price auction, the
highest accepted bid price sets the uniform market price for all accepted bids. In
a discriminatory auction, each accepted bid is paid its individual bid price.
Similar to classical auction theory, we solve for symmetric Bayesian Nash equi-
libria with the following properties: (i) the chosen bid price of rm i 2 f1; 2g is a
twice di¤erentiable function of its signal si and (ii) the bid is strictly monotonic
in the rms signal, i.e. p0i (si) > 0 for si 2 (s; s). Thus, the inverse p 1i (p) al-
ways exists in equilibrium. Strict monotonicity also implies that ties occur with
measure zero. Hence, the rationing rule will not inuence the expected prot of
producers in the equilibria for which we solve.
Ex-post, we denote the winning (low bid) producer, which gets a high output,
by subscript H. The losing (high bid) producer, which gets a low output, is
denoted by the subscript L. Winning and losing producers have the following
expected outputs:
qH = E [min (eqH ; D)] (5)
and
qL = E [max (0; D   eqH)] : (6)
The payo¤of each producer is given by its revenue minus its realized production
cost.
4 Analysis
4.1 Discriminatory pricing
Each rm is paid as bid under discriminatory pricing. The demand uncertainty
and production capacity uncertainties are independent of the cost uncertainties.
Thus, the expected prot of rm i when receiving signal si is:
i (si) = (pi (si)  E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) Pr (pj  pij si) qH
+ (pi (si)  E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL: (7)
Lemma 1 In markets with discriminatory pricing:
@i(si)
@pi
= Pr (pj  pij si) qH + (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL
+
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
(qH   qL) :
(8)
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A producer i does not know the signal of its competitor j. However, when
solving for the locally optimal bid, producer i is only interested in cases where
the competitor, producer j, is bidding really close to pi, which corresponds to the
competitor receiving the signal p 1j (pi). This explains why ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

is the
relevant cost of producer i in the above rst-order condition. The rst two terms on
the right-hand side of (8) correspond to the price e¤ect. This is what the producer
would gain in expectation from increasing its bid by one unit if the acceptance
probabilities were to remain unchanged. However, on the margin, a higher bid
price lowers the probability of being the winning bidder by @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
. Switching
from being the winning to the losing bidder reduces the accepted quantity by
qH   qL. We refer to @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi (qH   qL) as the quantity e¤ect, the quantity
that is lost on the margin from a marginal price increase. The mark-up for lost
sales, pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

, times the quantity e¤ect gives the lost value of the
quantity e¤ect. This is the last term on the right-hand side of (8).
We solve for a symmetric Bayesian NE and henceforth, we drop rm-specic
subscripts when appropriate. Producers may receive di¤erent signals but, in
equilibrium, they react in the same way to an observed signal s as implied by
the function p (s). In equilibrium, the price e¤ect, i.e. Pr (pj  pij si) qH +
(1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL, is proportional toZ s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqH +
Z s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL (9)
and the quantity e¤ect, i.e. @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
(qH   qL), is proportional to
(qH   qL)  (s; s)
p0 (s)
; (10)
where (s;s)
p0(s) represents the probability density in terms of bid prices. We nd it
useful to introduce the following exogenous function, which is proportional to the
ratio of the quantity and price e¤ect.
Denition 2
H (s) :=
 (s; s) (qH   qL)R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqH +
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL
: (11)
Equilibrium bids are chosen optimally for each signal. The implication is that
the price e¤ect equals the value of the quantity e¤ect for each signal. Thus, as
formally proven in the proof of Proposition 1, equilibrium bids can be determined
from the following ordinary di¤erential equation (ODE):
p0 (s)  (p  c (s; s))H (s) = 0: (12)
The solution to this ODE is presented below.
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Proposition 1 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid in a discriminatory
auction is given by:
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
e 
R v
s H
(u)dudv (13)
if d
ds
R s
x (s;sj)dsjqH+qL
R x
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;x)

 0. The equilibrium exists for more general
probability distributions when dc(v;v)
dv
> 0. In the limit when costs are almost surely
common knowledge, the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be simplied
to:
p (s) = c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H
(u)du (p  c (s; s)) ; (14)
for s 2 [s; s).
The term
R s
s
dc(v;v)
dv
e 
R v
s H
(u)dudv corresponds to the mark-up. It follows from
(12) that the mark-up is proportional to how sensitive the competitors bid is to
its signal, i.e. p0 (s). Thus, it is understandable that the mark-up increases when
the competitors cost is more sensitive to its signal, i.e. dc(v;v)
dv
is large. Given
that H (s) is proportional to the ratio of the quantity and price e¤ects, it also
makes sense that a high H (s) results in more competitive bids with lower mark-
ups. We also note from Denition 2 that H (s) and p (s) are determined by
the expected sales of the high price bidder and the low price bidder, but H (s)
and p (s) are independent of the variances of those sales. The reason is that,
by assumption, signals are independent of production capacities and demand. In
the limit when rmsmarginal costs are almost surely common knowledge, as in
(14), the signals only serve the purpose of coordinating producersactions as in a
correlated equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
Another conclusion that we can draw from Proposition 1 is that bidding behav-
iour is only inuenced by properties of ci (si; sj) at points where si = sj. Thus, it
does not matter for our analysis whether the costs are private, so that @ci(si;sj)
@sj
= 0,
or common, so that @ci(si;sj)
@sj
=
@ci(si;sj)
@si
. As noted above, the reason is that when
solving for the locally optimal bid, a producer is only interested in cases where the
competitor is bidding really close to pi. In a symmetric equilibrium, this occurs
when the competitor receives a similar signal. The properties of c () for signals
where si 6= sj could inuence the expected production cost of a rm, but not its
bidding behaviour. This would be di¤erent if each bidder submitted multiple bids
at di¤erent prices or even a continuous bid function as in Vives (2011).
Before drawing further conclusions from Proposition 1, we introduce the fol-
lowing denition:
Denition 3 We say that two pairs of probability density functions and marginal
cost functions

A (si; sj) ; c
A (si; sj)
	
and

B (si; sj) ; c
B (si; sj)
	
are equivalent
in expectation if:
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(i) the pairs have the same expected marginal cost conditional on a producers
private signal s
E

cA (s; sj)
 s = E cB (s; sj) s ;
(ii) the same marginal cost for common signals s
cA (s; s) = cB (s; s) ;
(iii) and the same marginal densityZ s
s
A (s; sj) dsj =
Z s
s
B (s; sj) dsj:
It can be shown fromDenition 2, (5) and (6) thatH (u) increases with respect
to the production capacity eq. The reason is that the quantity e¤ect increases when
the di¤erence between the output of the highest and the lowest bidder increases.
It also follows from Denition 2 that H (u) increases when the density at  (s; s)
increases relative to both
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj and
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj. The reason is simply
that the quantity e¤ect from increasing ones bid increases if, conditional on the
reception of a signal s, it becomes more likely that the competitor receives a similar
signal s and bids at a similar price. Thus, we can conclude from Proposition 1
that
Corollary 1 Mark-ups in the discriminatory auction are lower when eq increases
and are lower for the pair

A (si; sj) ; c
A (si; sj)
	
in comparison to the pair

B (si; sj) ; c
B (si; sj)
	
,
if the two pairs are equivalent in expectation and if signals in A (si; sj) are more
positively correlated signals in the sense that
A (s; s)R s
s
A (s; sj) dsj
>
B (s; s)R s
s
B (s; sj) dsj
and
A (s; s)R s
s
A (s; sj) dsj
>
B (s; s)R s
s
B (s; sj) dsj
:
Proposition 1 can be simplied in the special case when signals are independent.
Proposition 2 If signals are independent, the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium bid in a discriminatory auction is given by:
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

dv: (15)
If costs are almost surely common knowledge, then (15) can be simplied to:
p (s) = c (s; s) +

qL
((1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL)

(p  c (s; s)) for s 2 [s; s) , (16)
where F (s) = s is a rms (marginal) probability distribution for receiving the
signal s:
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In the limit when costs are almost surely independent of the signals, the in-
dependent signals e¤ectively become randomization devices, which the producers
use to randomize their bids. In this case, the functional form of the probability
density for signals is of no importance, because a rm will decide its bid based on
the probability that the competitor received a lower signal, F (s). Thus, bidding
behaviour would not change if the probability distribution were transformed by
the monotonic function p (s) into a new signal P = p (s) with the probability
distribution G (P ) = F (p (s)). If we rewrite (16), we get that
G (P ) =
qH
qH   qL  
p  c
P   c
qL
qH   qL ; (17)
which corresponds to the mixed-strategy NE that is calculated for discriminatory
auctions by Fabra et al. (2006). This conrms Harsanyis (1973) purication
theorem that a mixed-strategy NE is equivalent to a pure-strategy Bayesian NE,
where costs are almost surely common knowledge and signals are independent.
Finally, we note that divisible-good models of discriminatory auctions, where
each producer makes a single bid, are identical to the Bertrand model. Thus, the
results in this section are also relevant for the Bertrand-Edgeworth game.
4.1.1 Non-pivotal case
Only the lowest bid is accepted when eqi > D for all i 2 f1; 2g and all outcomes,
so that producers are non-pivotal with certainty, i.e. qL = 0 and qH = E [D].
This simplies the expressions to the below result, which corresponds to Milgrom
and Webers (1982) result for rst-price indivisible-good auctions. If producers
are non-pivotal with certainty, then the winning bid sets its own price also in the
uniform-price auction. Thus, there is no di¤erence between a discriminatory and
a uniform-price auction in this special case. In this case, both correspond to the
rst-price auction in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Proposition 3 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of producers that are
non-pivotal with certainty in auctions with uniform or discriminatory pricing is
given by:
p(s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
e 
R v
s H(u)dudv; (18)
where
H (s) :=
 (s; s)R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
: (19)
This is an equilibrium if the signals are weakly a¢ liated. The equilibrium exists
for more general distributions when dc(v;v)
dv
> 0. In the limit when costs are almost
surely common knowledge, the equilibrium bid in (18) is perfectly competitive, i.e.
p(s) = c (s; s) for s 2 [s; s).
Mark-ups are zero in the limit when costs are almost surely common knowledge.
This concurs with von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Fabra et al. (2006), where
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mark-ups are zero in auctions with both uniform and discriminatory pricing, if
producers are non-pivotal with certainty and marginal costs are constant and
common knowledge. Thus, their result for non-pivotal producers is robust to the
probability distribution of weakly a¢ liated signals. The same robustness property
applies to the Bertrand game. But private information gives an informational rent,
so if costs are asymmetric information, then non-pivotal bidders also have a mark-
up.
4.2 Uniform-pricing
Proposition 3 also applies to non-pivotal producers in a uniform-price auction. Be-
low we consider producers that are pivotal with certainty. Later, we will consider
the general case where producers are pivotal with a positive probability less than
one.
Denition 4 Producers are pivotal with certainty if it is always the case that eqH <
D  eqH + eqL.
The highest bid sets the market price in a uniform-price auction when produc-
ers are pivotal with certainty. The demand and production capacity uncertainties
are independent of the signals and cost uncertainties. Thus, when producers are
pivotal with certainty, the expected prot of rm i when receiving signal si is:
i (si) = E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] Pr (pj  pij si) qH
+ (pi (si)  E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL: (20)
Lemma 2 In a uniform-price auction with producers that are pivotal with cer-
tainty, we have:
@i(si)
@pi
= (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL
+
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

(qH   qL) :
(21)
The rst-order condition for the uniform-price auction is similar to the rst-
order condition of the discriminatory auction in Lemma 1, but there is one di¤er-
ence. In contrast to the discriminatory auction, the lowest bidder does not gain
anything from increasing its bid in a uniform-price auction when producers are
pivotal with certainty. Thus, the price e¤ect has one term less in the uniform-price
auction, which reduces the price e¤ect. There is a corresponding change in the H
function which is proportional to the ratio of the quantity and price e¤ect. Thus,
we introduce H^ (s).
Denition 5
H^ (s) =
(qH   qL) (s; s)
qL
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
:
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Proposition 4 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid in a uniform-price
auction where producers are pivotal with certainty is given by
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
e 
R v
s H^(u)dudv (22)
if signals are weakly una¢ liated. The equilibrium exists for more general prob-
ability distributions when dc(v;v)
dv
> 0. In the limit when costs are almost surely
common knowledge, the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid simplies to:
p (s) = c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H^(u)du (p  c (s; s)) ; (23)
for s 2 [s; s).
(22) has properties similar to the corresponding expressions for the discrimi-
natory auction in Proposition 1. But the ratio of the quantity and price e¤ects
di¤ers. It follows from Denitions 2 and 5 that H^ (s) > H (s) or, equivalently,
that the price e¤ect is relatively smaller in the uniform price auction as compared
to a discriminatory auction. Thus, producers bid with lower mark-ups in uniform-
price auctions. On the other hand, in a uniform-price auction, the losing bid (the
highest bid) sets the transaction price for both accepted bids, so in the end it is
not self-evident that a uniform-price auction would lower the procurement cost of
an auctioneer.
Analogous to the discriminatory case, it can be shown from Denition 5, (5)
and (6) that H^ (u) increases with respect to the production capacity eq. It also
follows from Denition 5 that H^ (u) increases when the density at  (s; s) in-
creases relative to
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj. Thus, we can conclude from Proposition 4 and
Denition 3 that
Corollary 2 Mark-ups in a uniform-price auction where producers are pivotal
with certainty are lower when eq increases and are lower for the pair A (si; sj) ; cA (si; sj)	
in comparison to the pair

B (si; sj) ; c
B (si; sj)
	
, if the two pairs are equivalent
in expectation and if the signals in A (si; sj) are more positively correlated in the
sense that
A (s; s)R s
s
A (s; sj) dsj
>
B (s; s)R s
s
B (s; sj) dsj
:
It follows from Denition 5, (5), (6) and Proposition 4 that
Corollary 3 In a uniform-price auction with certain demand and production ca-
pacities, it is optimal for rm i to bid:
i) pi (s) = ci (si; si) in the limit where eq % D, i.e. when rms are just pivotal.
ii) pi (s) = p in the limit where 2eq & D, i.e. when both rms always produce at
full capacity.
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The rst property corresponds to Milgrom and Webers (1982) results for
second-price sales auctions, because the lowest bidder gets to produce the whole
demand while the highest bidder sets the uniform market price. By comparing
Proposition 3 and Corollary 3, we note that the comparative statics analysis of
our symmetric equilibrium has a discontinuity at the critical point where produc-
erscapacities switch from being nonpivotal with certainty to being pivotal with
certainty. Somewhat counter-intuitively, bids decrease at this critical point, even
if demand increases. The reason for this is that the bid that sets the market
price also switches at this point, which drastically changes the bidding behaviour.
Non-pivotal rms set their own price and use similar bidding strategies as in a
rst-price procurement auction, i.e. rmsmark-ups are strictly positive for un-
certain costs. On the other hand, as implied by the rst property of Corollary
3, producers bid without a mark-up when rms are just pivotal. The following
proves that the auctioneers revenues may also shift downwards in a comparative
statics analysis at the critical point where producerscapacities switch from being
nonpivotal with certainty to being pivotal with certainty.
Proposition 5 If rmssignals are weakly a¢ liated, then the expected revenues of
the auctioneer are weakly larger for just non-pivotal producers than for producers
that are just pivotal with certainty in markets with uniform pricing. The expected
revenues are the same for the two cases when the signals are independent .
Proposition 4 can be simplied in the special case when the signals are inde-
pendent.
Proposition 6 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid in a uniform-price
auction where producers are pivotal with certainty is given by:
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv

F (s)
F (v)
 (qH qL)
qL
dv (24)
if signals are independent. If, in addition, costs are almost surely common knowl-
edge, then (24) can be simplied to
p (s) = c (s; s) + (F (s))
(qH qL)
qL (p  c (s; s)) for s 2 [s; s) ; (25)
where F (s) is a rms marginal distribution for receiving the signal s:
We can use an argument similar to the one that we used for the discriminatory
auction to show that the limit result in (25) corresponds to the mixed-strategy NE
that is derived for uniform-price auctions by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).
Proposition 7 If the signals are independent, the costs are almost surely common
knowledge and producers are pivotal with certainty, then the expected market price
in the uniform-price auction is given by:
p  (p  c) (qH   qL)
qH + qL
;
where c = c (s; s) :
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Figure 1: Comparative statics analysis for our symmetric equilibrium and von der
Fehr and Harbords (1993) high-price equilibrium in a uniform-price auction.
In the special case with certain demand and certain production capacities that
are pivotal, we have qH = eq and qL = D   eq > 0, so that the expected market
price is given by
p  (p  c) (2eq  D)
D
: (26)
Our symmetric Bayesian NE for the uniform-price auction has similar proper-
ties to von der Fehr and Harbords (1993) symmetric mixed-strategy NE, especially
when the cost uncertainty is small and the signals are independent in our setting.
However, their asymmetric high-price equilibrium has quite di¤erent properties.
Figure 1 presents comparative statics analyses of the symmetric and high-price
equilibria with respect to the (expected) demand level when the costs are almost
surely common knowledge. In the high-price equilibrium, the market price jumps
directly from the competitive price with zero mark-ups up to the reservation price
when demand increases at the critical point where producers switch from being
non-pivotal to being pivotal. In the symmetric equilibrium, on the other hand, the
expected market price increases continuously as demand increases. The expected
market price does not reach the reservation price until demand equals the total
production capacity in the market. With more rms in the market, the expected
price in our model would stay near the marginal cost until demand is near the
total production capacity in the market, where the expected price will take o¤
towards the reservation price. This would be reminiscent of hockey-stick pricing
that is typical for wholesale electricity markets (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg
and Newbery, 2010).
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4.2.1 Uncertain pivotal status
There is no di¤erence in the discriminatory case, but for a uniform-price auction
the case where a producer is both pivotal and non-pivotal with a strictly positive
probability is more complicated than the case where producers are pivotal with
certainty. The problem is that the lowest bidder would set its own transaction
price, as in a discriminatory auction, for outcomes when the highest bidder is
non-pivotal, while the highest bidder would set the transaction price of the lowest
bidder when the highest bidder is pivotal. Thus, unlike the discriminatory auction,
the payo¤ of the winning producer depends on the probability that the highest
bidder is non-pivotal. We denote this probability by NP .
Lemma 3 In a uniform-price auction, where producers can be pivotal and non-
pivotal with positive probabilities, we have:
@i(si)
@pi
=
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

(qH   qL)
+ Pr (pj  pij si) qNPH NP + (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL;
(27)
where
qNPH = E [eqH j eqH  D] :
Thus, the quantity e¤ect is the same as when producers are pivotal or non-
pivotal with certainty. But the price e¤ect depends on the probability that rms
are pivotal. Increasing a bid contributes to the price e¤ect when the bidder is
price-setting, i.e. when it has the highest bid and the highest bidder is pivotal
(qL > 0) or when it has the lowest bid and the highest bidder is non-pivotal. There
is a corresponding change in the H function.
Denition 6
eH (s) =  (s; s) (qH   qL)R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqNPH 
NP +
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL
:
Proposition 8 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid in a uniform-price
auction where producers can be pivotal and non-pivotal with positive probabilities
is given by
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
e 
R v
s
eH(u)dudv (28)
if d
ds
R s
x (s;sj)dsjq
NP
H 
NP+qL
R x
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;x)

 0. The equilibrium exists for more gen-
eral probability distributions when dc(v;v)
dv
> 0. In the limit when costs are almost
surely common knowledge, the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid simplies
to:
p (s) = c (s; s) + e 
R s
s
eH(u)du (p  c (s; s)) ; (29)
for s 2 [s; s).
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We note that asNP increases towards 1, the bidding behaviour in the uniform-
price auction gets closer to bids in the discriminatory auction, which concurs with
our discussion in Section 4.1.1. In the other extreme, bidding gets closer to the
uniform-price auction with producers that are pivotal with certainty when NP
decreases towards 0. For a given qNPH , producers will increase their bids when 
NP
increases. This may seem counterintuitive, but this is to compensate for the fact
that there is a higher risk that the market price is set by the lowest bid rather
than the highest bid. We can draw the following conclusion from Proposition 8
and Denition 6.
Corollary 4 Mark-ups in an auction with uniform-pricing are lower when eq in-
creases and are lower for the pair

A (si; sj) ; c
A (si; sj)
	
in comparison to the
pair

B (si; sj) ; c
B (si; sj)
	
, if the two pairs are equivalent in expectation and if
the signals in A (si; sj) are more positively correlated signals in the sense that
A (s; s)R s
s
A (s; sj) dsj
>
B (s; s)R s
s
B (s; sj) dsj
and
A (s; s)R s
s
A (s; sj) dsj
>
B (s; s)R s
s
B (s; sj) dsj
:
Proposition 4 can be simplied in the special case when signals are independent.
Proposition 9 The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid in a uniform-price
auction where producers can be pivotal or nonpivotal with positive probabilities is
given by:
p (s) = c (s; s) +
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv

(1  F (v)) qNPH NP + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
dv
(30)
if the signals are independent. If, in addition, costs are almost surely common
knowledge, then (24) can be simplied to
p (s) = c (s; s)+

qL
((1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL)
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
(p  c (s; s)) for s 2 [s; s)
(31)
where F (s) is a rms marginal distribution for receiving the signal s:
4.3 Ranking of auction formats
We already know from Section 4.1.1 that the two auction formats are equivalent
in the non-pivotal case. The following result shows that there are cases where the
two auction formats are equivalent also when producers are pivotal with a positive
probability, so that qL > 0.
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Proposition 10 If signals are independent and costs are almost surely common
knowledge, then the expected prot for a producer is given by
 (s) = qL (p  c (s; s)) ;
for both the uniform-price and the discriminatory auction and irrespective of the
probability that the highest bidder is pivotal.
However, an auctioneer tends to prefer the uniform-price auction if the costs
are uncertain.
Proposition 11 If signals are independent and costs are uncertain, then an auc-
tioneer will (weakly) prefer a uniform-price auction. For xed expected sales of
the winning and losing bidder, a higher probability that the winning bidder is piv-
otal strictly lowers the auctioneers payo¤ in a uniform-price auction, but does not
inuence the payo¤s in a discriminatory auction.
For a given marginal distribution F (s), we can from Denition 2 and Propo-
sition 1 identify circumstances where a joint probability distribution  (u; v) will
give a higher bid in the discriminatory auction in comparison to the case with
independent signals, where  (u; v) = f (u) f (v). Similarly, for the same marginal
distribution F (s), we can use Denition 6 and Proposition 8 to identify circum-
stances where a joint probability distribution  (u; v) will give a lower bid in the
uniform-price auction in comparison to the case with independent signals, where
 (u; v) = f (u) f (v). Together with Proposition 11, such an argument gives the
following result:
Corollary 5 Provided that the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently large so that an
equilibrium exists in both auctions, an auctioneer will (weakly) prefer a uniform-
price auction to a discriminatory auction if the joint probability density of signals
 (u; v) with the marginal distribution F (u) satisfy:
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qLR s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqNPH 
NP +
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL
 f (s)
 (s; s)
 (1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qLR s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqH +
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL
:
(32)
for all s.
We have qH  qNPH NP , so we note that a necessary condition for (32) to be
satised is that (1 F (s))
f(s)

R s
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;s)
and that F (s)
f(s)

R s
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;s)
for all s. The
condition is satised for a larger set of joint probability densities  (u; v) when the
probability that the winning bidder is pivotal increases, so that qNPH 
NP decreases,
for a given qH .
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5 Concluding discussion
We consider a duopoly model of a divisible-good procurement auction with pro-
duction uncertainty, such as a wholesale electricity market. Each producer receives
a private signal with imperfect cost information from a non-parametric probability
distribution and then makes one bid for its whole production capacity. Demand
and production capacities could also be uncertain. However, producers do not
have any private information about such events.
We solve for a symmetric Bayesian NE. We show that the auctioneer prefers
uniform pricing to discriminatory pricing when producerssignals are close to inde-
pendent. The advantages of uniform-price auctions increase when cost uncertainty
increases and when rms are pivotal with a higher probability. Moreover, competi-
tion improves if producers receive less noisy cost information. The latter concurs
with a similar result for another bidding format by Vives (2011), and Milgrom
and Webers (1982) result for single object auctions. Taken together, this sup-
ports the measures taken by the European Commission to increase transparency
in European wholesale electricity markets.
We are concerned that cost uncertainty could result in major mark-ups in
hydro dominated electricity markets with scarce water. This could explain extra-
ordinarily high price-periods that typically accompany scarcity of water in such
markets. One measure that could mitigate this is to clearly dene contingency
plans for intervention by the market operator and the regulator under extreme
system conditions.
If producers are pivotal, then disclosure of information is only benecial up to
a point. A pivotal producer can deviate to the reservation price, which ensures it
a minimum prot. Thus, there is a lower bound on how small equilibrium mark-
ups can become. Mark-ups tend to be higher in the discriminatory auction in
comparison to the uniform-price auction, so disclosure of information should be
somewhat more useful in such auctions. Our results and related results in Vives
(2011) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) have been proven for a one-shot game. In
a repeated game, there is a risk that increased transparency will facilitate tacit
collusion as argued by von der Fehr (2013).
We show that equilibrium bids in a discriminatory auction are determined by
the expected sales of the highest and lowest bidder, respectively. The variance
of these sales due to demand shocks, production outages and volatile renewable
production will not inuence the bidding behaviour of producers. Bidding in the
uniform-price auction is also insensitive to these variances, as long as they are not
su¢ ciently large to occasionally change the pivotal status of at least one producer.
Unlike Vives (2011), our results do not depend on the extent to which the cost
uncertainty is private, interdependent or common. In his setting, producers choose
linear supply functions and can therefore condition their output on every price. To
a larger extent than in our model, his bidding format allows producers to condition
their output on the competitors information. Thus, our results and the results
in Vives (2011) indicate that when the cost uncertainty is common or strongly
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interdependent, which should often be the case in wholesale electricity markets,
then it should be optimal to limit the number of allowed steps in producers
supply functions in order to give producers less freedom to condition their output
on competitorssignals. This also suggests that bidding formats, where producers
make piece-wise linear bids, as in the Nordic countries (Nord Pool) and France
(Power Next), can be harmful for market competitiveness.
We consider unique symmetric equilibria. Our general analysis is for cases
where producers are not certain whether they are pivotal or not. But as shown by
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), the uniform-price auction has another asym-
metric, high-price equilibrium if producers are certain that they are pivotal. Fabra
et al. (2006) consider the high-price equilibrium in the uniform-price auction when
comparing auction formats. This explains why they get a di¤erent ranking of the
uniform and discriminatory price auctions than we do.
Similar to von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), our results also indicate that
wholesale electricity markets that require producers to submit stepped supply
function bids have an inherent price instability. Even if the cost uncertainty in our
model were arbitrarily small, the chosen bid price of a producer can still increase
drastically if it receives a signal that indicates that the producers costs are slightly
higher. Thus, according to our model, observed price volatilities would be larger
than what would be expected from variations in demand and costs. This is true for
both the uniform-price and the discriminatory auction. However, as conjectured
by Newbery (1998), it seems plausible that the inherent price instability of the
market design will become smaller if producers, as is the case in practice, are
allowed to choose a larger number of steps in their supply functions.
6 References
Allen, B. and Hellwig, M. (1986), Price-setting rms and the oligopolistic foun-
dations of perfect competition, The American Economic Review 76, 387-392.
Anderson, E., P. Holmberg and A. Philpott (2013), Mixed Strategies in Dis-
criminatory Divisible-good Auctions, Rand Journal of Economics 44 (1), 132.
Anwar, A. (2006). Single or Multiple Pricing in Electricity Pools?, Working
Paper, Department of Economics, Edinburgh University.
Ausubel, L.M., P. Cramton, M. Pycia, M. Rostek, and M. Weretka (2014).
Demand Reduction and Ine¢ ciency in Multi-Unit Auctions, Review of Economic
Studies 81 (4), 1366-1400.
Back, K. and Zender, J. (1993), Auctions of divisible goods: on the rationale
for the treasury experiment, Review of Financial Studies 6, 733-764.
Bartolini, L. and Cottarelli, C. (1997), Treasury bill auctions: issues and uses.
In M. I. Blejer and T. Ter-Minassian, eds., Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public
Finance: Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi. London: Routledge.
Beckmann, M. (1967), Edgeworth-Bertrand duopoly revisited In R. Henn,
ed., Methods of Operations Research III, Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain.
22
Blázquez de Paz, M. (2014), Designing Electricity Auctions in the Presence of
Transmission Constraints. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Economics, University of
Bologna.
Che, Y-K. and Gale, I. (1998), Standard Auctions with Financially Con-
strained Bidders, Review of Economic Studies 65, 1-21.
Deneckere, R. and D. Kovenock (1996), Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with
unit cost asymmetry, Economic Theory 8(1), 1-25.
Edgeworth, F. (1925). Papers Relating to Political Economy. London: Macmil-
lan.
EU (2011). EU regulation No 1227/2011 of 25 October 2011 on wholesale
energy market integrity and transparency.
EU (2013). EU Regulation No 543/2013 of 14 June 2013 on submission and
publication of data in electricity markets.
Fabra, N., N-H. M. von der Fehr and D. Harbord (2006). Designing Electricity
Auctions, RAND Journal of Economics 37 (1), pp. 23-46.
von der Fehr, N-H. M. and D. Harbord (1993). Spot Market Competition in
the UK Electricity Industry, Economic Journal 103 (418), pp. 531-46.
von der Fehr, N. H. M. (2013). Transparency in electricity markets, Eco-
nomics of Energy & Environmental Policy 2(2), pp. 87-105.
Gal-Or, E. (1986). Information transmissionCournot and Bertrand equilibria.
The Review of Economic Studies LIII, pp. 85-92.
Genc, T. (2009). Discriminatory versus uniform-price electricity auctions with
supply function equilibrium, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
140, pp. 9-31.
Genc, T. S., and Reynolds, S. S. (2011). Supply function equilibria with
capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers, International Journal of Industrial
Organization 29(4), pp. 432-442.
Green, R. J., D. M. Newbery (1992), Competition in the British electricity
spot market, Journal of Political Economy 100, 929953.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1973). Games with randomly disturbed payo¤s: a new ratio-
nale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points, Int. J. Game Theory 2, pp. 123.
Holmberg, P. (2008). Unique supply function equilibrium with capacity con-
straints, Energy Economics 30, 148172.
Holmberg, P. (2009). Supply function equilibria of pay-as-bid auctions, Jour-
nal of Regulatory Economics 36, 154-177.
Holmberg, P. and E. Lazarczyk (2015). Comparison of congestion manage-
ment techniques: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing, Energy Journal 36,
pp. 145-166.
Holmberg, P. and Newbery, D.M. (2010). The supply function equilibrium and
its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions. Utilities Policy 18(4), pp.
209226.
Holmberg, P., D. Newbery and D. Ralph (2013). Supply function equilibria:
Step functions and continuous representations, Journal of Economic Theory 148,
pp. 15091551.
Hurlbut, D., K. Rogas, and S. Oren (2004), Hockey Stick Pricing: How the
23
Public Utility Commission of Texas is Dealing with Potential Price Gouging, The
Electricity Journal 17(3), pp. 26-33.
Kastl, J. (2012). On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good
auctions with constrained bidding, Journal of Mathematical Economics 48(6), pp.
339-352.
Klemperer, P. D., M. A. Meyer. (1989). Supply function equilibria in oligopoly
under uncertainty, Econometrica 57, 12431277.
Krishna, V. (2010). Auction theory, Academic Press: London.
Levitan, R. and Shubik, M. (1972), Price duopoly and capacity constraints,
International Economic Review 13, 111-122.
Maskin, E. (1986), The existence of equilibrium with price-setting rms, The
American Economic Review 76, 382-386.
Milgrom, P.R. and R.J. Weber (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive
bidding, Econometrica 50 (5), pp. 1089-1122.
Newbery, D. (1998), Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity
Spot Market, The RAND Journal of Economics 29 (4), 726-749.
Osborne, M., Pitchik, C. (1986). Price competition in a capacity-constrained
duopoly, Journal of Economic Theory 38, 238260.
Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A course in game theory, MIT Press:Cambridge,
MA.
Parisio, L. and B. Bosco (2003). Market Power and the Power Market: Multi-
Unit Bidding and (In)E¢ ciency in Electricity Auctions, International Tax and
Public Finance 10(4), pp. 377-401.
Pycia, M., and Woodward, K. (2015). "Pay-As-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods
to Uninformed Bidders.", Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles.
Rostek, M., and Weretka, M. (2012). Price inference in small markets, Econo-
metrica 80(2), 687-711.
Vives, X. (1986), Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large
markets, Economics Letters 21, 113-116.
Vives, X. (2011), Strategic supply function competition with private informa-
tion, Econometrica 79(6), 19191966.
Wang, J. J. D., J.F. Zender (2002). Auctioning divisible goods, Economic
Theory 19, pp. 673705.
Wilson, R. (1979), Auctions of shares, Quarterly Journal of Economics 93,
675689.
Wolak, F.A. (2007), Quantifying the Supply-Side Benets from Forward Con-
tracting in Wholesale Electricity Markets, Journal of Applied Econometrics 22,
pp. 1179-1209.
Appendix
Before proving the lemmas and propositions in the main text, we will derive
some results that will be used throughout these proofs. By assumption, pj (sj)
24
is monotonic and invertible. Thus, we get
Pr (pj  pij si) =
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsjR s
s (si;sj)dsj
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
=
 p 10j (pi)(si;p 1j (pi))R s
s (si;sj)dsj
:
(33)
Moreover,
E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] =
R s
p 1
j (pi)
ci(si;sj)(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
=
R s
p 1
j (pi)
ci(si;sj)(si;sj)dsj
Pr(pjpijsi)
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
@E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
=
p 10j (pi)(si;p
 1
j (pi))
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(ci(si;sj) ci(si;p 1j (pi)))(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
2
=
 
@ Pr( pjpijsi)
@pi
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(ci(si;sj) ci(si;p 1j (pi)))(si;sj)dsj
(Pr(pjpijsi))2
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
:
(34)
From (33) and (34), we have that:
 @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
Pr (pj  pij si)  E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi
=
 R s
p 1
j (pi)
(ci(si;sj) ci(si;p 1j (pi)))(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
 
R s
p 1
j (pi)
ci(si;sj)(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
!
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
=  
R s
p 1
j (pi)
ci(si;p 1j (pi))(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
=  ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
:
Using the above equation, we can derive the following result:
1  @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi

Pr (pj  pij si) + (pi   E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi
= Pr (pj  pij si) +
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
:
(35)
Similarly, from (33), we have that
E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] =
R p 1j (pi)
s ci(si;sj)(si;sj)dsjR p 1j (pi)
s (si;sj)dsj
=
R p 1j (pi)
s ci(si;sj)(si;sj)dsj
(1 Pr(pjpijsi))
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
@E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
=
p 10j (pi)(si;p
 1
j (pi))
R p 1j (pi)
s (ci(si;p 1j (pi)) ci(si;sj))(si;sj)dsj R p 1j (pi)
s (si;sj)dsj
!2
=
 
@ Pr( pjpijsi)
@pi
R p 1j (pi)
s (ci(si;p 1j (pi)) ci(si;sj))(si;sj)dsj
(1 Pr(pjpijsi))2
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
:
(36)
It now follows from (36) that:
 @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
(1  Pr (pj  pij si)) + E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi
=
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

:
(37)
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Discriminatory auction
Proof. (Lemma 1) It follows from (7) that
@i(si)
@pi
=

1  @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi

Pr (pj  pij si) qH
+ (pi   E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi qH
+

1  @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi

(1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL
  (pi   E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi qL:
(38)
Using (35) and the relation in (37) yields:
@i(si)
@pi
= Pr (pj  pij si) qH +
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
qH
+ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
qL
+ (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL   pi @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi qL;
which gives (8).
Proof. (Proposition 1) We solve for symmetric strategies, so that pi (s) =
pj (s) = p (s). We also note that p 10 (p) = 1p0(s) . We get the rst-order condition
from (8) and by setting @i(si)
@pi
= 0. Using (33), this condition can be written as
follows:Z s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqH +
Z s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL   (p  c (s; s))
p0 (s)
 (s; s) (qH   qL) = 0:
We can use the denition in (11) to write the rst-order condition on the following
form:
p0 (s)  (p  c (s; s))H (s) = 0: (39)
Multiplication by the integrating factor e
R s
s H
(u)du yields:
p0 (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du   pH (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du
=  c (s; s)H (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du ;
so that
d
ds

p (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du

=  c (s; s)H (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du :
Next we integrate both sides from s to s.
p  p (s) e
R s
s H
(u)du =  
Z s
s
c (v; v)H (v) e
R s
v H
(u)du dv
p (s) = pe 
R s
s H
(u)du +
Z s
s
c (v; v)H (v) e 
R v
s H
(u)dudv:
We use integration by parts to rewrite the above expression as follows:
p (s) = pe 
R s
s H
(u)du +
h
 c (v; v) e 
R v
s H
(u)du
is
s
+
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
e 
R v
s H
(u)dudv;
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which gives (13), because c (s; s) = p. It is clear from (13) that p > c (s; s) for
s 2 [s; s). Hence, it follows from (39) that p0 (s) > 0 for s 2 [s; s).
It remains to show that p (s) is an equilibrium. It follows from (8) and (33)
that
@i (s)
@p
=
R s
p 1j (p)
 (s; sj) dsjR s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
qH +
R p 1j (p)
s
 (s; sj) dsjR s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
qL
 p
 10
j (p)
 
s; p 1j (p)
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
 
p  ci
 
s; p 1j (p)

(qH   qL) :
@i (s)
@p
=

 
s; p 1j (p)
R s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
0@R sp 1j (p)  (s; sj) dsj

 
s; p 1j (p)
 qH + R p
 1
j (pi)
s
 (s; sj) dsj

 
s; p 1j (p)
 qL
 p 10j (p)
 
p  ci
 
s; p 1j (p)

(qH   qL)

:
We know that @i(s)
@p
= 0 for s = p 1j (p). We assume that
d
ds
R s
x (s;sj)dsjqH+qL
R x
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;x)


0. Thus, it follows from the above and (3) that @i(s)
@p
> 0 when s > p 1j (p) ()
p < pj (s) and that
@i(s)
@p
< 0 when s < p 1j (p) () p > pj (s). Thus, p (s)
maximizes the prot of rm i.
In the special case when costs are almost surely common knowledge, we have
dc(v;v)
dv
& 0 for v < s, so it follows from (13) that
p (s)! c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H
(u)du
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv;
which gives (14).
(Proposition 2) First we note that  (s; sj) = f (s) f (sj) for independent
signals, so the inequality
d
ds
 R s
x
 (s; sj) dsjqH + qL
R x
s
 (s; sj) dsj
 (s; x)
!
=
d
ds
 R s
x
f (s) f (sj) dsjqH + qL
R x
s
f (s) f (sj) dsj
f (s) f (x)
!
=
=
d
ds
 R s
x
f (sj) dsjqH + qL
R x
s
f (sj) dsj
f (x)
!
= 0  0
is satised. Thus, it follows from Proposition 1 that the global second-order con-
dition is satised. Moreover, for independent signals, we have from Denition 2
that
H (s) =
f (s) (qH   qL)R s
s
f (sj) dsjqH +
R s
s
f (sj) dsjqL
=   d
ds
ln
Z s
s
f (sj) dsjqH +
Z s
s
f (sj) dsjqL

:
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Thus, (13) can be written as in (15).
In case costs are almost surely common knowledge, so that dc(v;v)
dv
& 0 for
v < s, (15) can be simplied to (16) as follows:
p (s) = c (s; s) +
 R s
s
f (sj) dsjqLR s
s
f (sj) dsjqH +
R s
s
f (sj) dsjqL
!Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv
= c (s; s) +

qL
((1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL)

(p  c (s; s)) ;
where F (s) is the marginal probability distribution.
Non-pivotal case
The following lemma is useful when deriving results for the non-pivotal case.
Lemma 4 e 
R v
s H(u)du > 0 for s  s < v < s and e 
R v
s H(u)du = 0 for s  s < v =
s.
Proof. It follows from (19) that
H (u) =
 (u; u)R s
u
 (u; sj) dsj
=   d
du
ln
Z s
u
 (u; sj) dsj

+
R s
u
1 (u; sj) dsjR s
u
 (u; sj) dsj
: (40)
The assumptions that we make for the joint probability density imply that
R s
u 1(u;sj)dsjR s
u (u;sj)dsj
is bounded. Thus, e 
R v
s H(u)du is strictly positive, unless
e[ln(
R s
u (u;sj)dsj)]
v
s = eln(
R s
v (v;sj)dsj) ln(
R s
s (s;sj)dsj)
=
R s
v
 (v; sj) dsjR s
s
 (s; sj) dsj
is equal to zero. This is the case if and only if
R s
v
 (v; sj) dsj = 0. It follows from
the assumptions that we make on the joint probability distribution that this is the
case if and only if v = s.
Proof. (Proposition 3) We have qL = 0 in the non-pivotal case, so it
is evident that H (s) simplies to (19). For weakly a¢ liated signals, we have
d
ds

(s;sj)
(s;x)

 0 if sj  x, which ensures that the global second-order condition is
satised when qL = 0. The result now follows from Proposition 1.
By denition, we have that dc(v;v)
dv
= 0 for s < s when costs are almost surely
common knowledge, so it follows from (18) that
p (s) = c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H(u)du
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv
= c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H(u)du (p  c (s; s)) :
The statement now follows from Lemma 4 above.
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Uniform-price auction
The following derivations will be useful when analysing uniform-price auctions. It
follows from (33) that:
E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] =
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(pj(sj) ci(si;sj))(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
=
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(pj(sj) ci(si;sj))(si;sj)dsj
Pr(pjpijsi)
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
@E[pj ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
=
p 10j (pi)(si;p
 1
j (pi))
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(pj(sj) ci(si;sj) (pi ci(si;p 1j (pi))))(si;sj)dsjR s
p 1
j (pi)
(si;sj)dsj
2
=
 
@ Pr( pjpijsi)
@pi
R s
p 1
j (pi)
(pj(si) ci(si;sj) (pi ci(si;p 1j (pi))))(si;sj)dsj
(Pr(pjpijsi))2
R s
s (si;sj)dsj
:
(41)
It now follows from (33) and (41) that:
@E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]
@pi
Pr (pj  pij si) (42)
+E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] @ Pr (pj  pij si)
@pi
=
@ Pr (pj  pij si)
@pi
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

:
Proof. (Lemma 2) We have from (20) that
@i(si)
@pi
=
@E[pj ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi
Pr (pj  pij si) qH
+E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi qH
+

1  @E[ ci(si;sj)jpjpi]
@pi

(1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL
  (pi   E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) @ Pr(pjpijsi)@pi qL:
(43)
It now follows from (37) and (42) that (43) can be simplied to (21).
Proof. (Proposition 4)We use (21) to solve for symmetric strategies, so that
pi (s) = pj (s) = p (s). We note that p 10 (p) = 1p0(s) . Using (33) and Denition 5,
the rst-order condition @i(si)
@pi
= 0 can be written as follows:Z s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL   (p  c (s; s))
p0 (s)
 (s; s) (qH   qL) = 0
p0 (s)  pH^ (s) =  c (s; s) H^ (s) :
The property of una¢ liated signals in (2) implies that d
ds
R x
s (s;sj)dsj
(s;x)

 0 for
x > sj. The statement now follows from an argument similar to that used in the
proof of Proposition 1.
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In the special case when costs are almost surely common knowledge, we have
by denition that dc(v;v)
dv
= 0 for s < s, so it follows from (22) that
p (s) = c (s; s) + e 
R s
s H^(u)du
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv;
which gives (23).
Proof. (Proposition 5) In the non-pivotal case, the lowest bidder sets the
market price and the lowest bidder gets to produce the entire demand, which
corresponds to a rst-price procurement auction. In the just pivotal case, the
highest bidder sets the market price and the lowest bidder gets to produce the
entire demand, which corresponds to a second-price auction. Thus, the statement
follows from Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Proof. (Proposition 6)
For independent signals we have  (s; sj) = f (s) f (sj), so it follows from
Denition 5 that
H^ (u) =
(qH   qL) f (u)
qL
R u
s
f (sj) dsj
=
d
du
(qH   qL) ln
R u
s
f (sj) dsj

qL
:
Thus (22) can be written as in (24). Independent signals are weakly a¢ liated.
This ensures that the su¢ ciency condition in Proposition 4 is satised.
In the special case when costs are almost surely common knowledge, we have
by denition that dc(v;v)
dv
= 0 for s < s, so it follows from (24) that
p (s) = c (s; s) + (F (s))
(qH qL)
qL
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv;
where F (s) is the marginal probability distribution. This gives (25).
Proof. (Proposition 7) We let G (P ) be the probability that a producers
bid is below P . This is the same as the probability that s is below p 1 (P ). Hence,
it follows from (25) that
G (P ) =

P   c
p  c
 qL
qH qL
:
From the theory of order statistics we know that
G2 (P ) =

P   c
p  c
 2qL
qH qL
is the probability distribution of the highest bid, which sets the price. Hence,
the probability density of the market price is given by 2G (p)G0 (p). Thus, the
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expected market price is given by:Z p
c
2G (p)G0 (p) pdp =

G2 (p) p
p
c
 
Z p
c
G2 (p) dp
= p 
264 (p  c) 2qLqH qL+1
2qL
qH qL + 1

(p  c)
2qL
qH qL
375
p
c
= p  (p  c) (qH   qL)
qH + qL
Proof. (Lemma 3) The demand and production capacity uncertainties are
independent of the signals and cost uncertainties. Thus, when producers are piv-
otal with certainty, the expected prot of rm i when receiving signal si is:
i (si) = E [pj   ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] Pr (pj  pij si) qPH
 
1  NP 
+E [pi (si)  ci (si; sj)j pj  pi] Pr (pj  pij si) qNPH NP
+ (pi (si)  E [ci (si; sj)j pj  pi]) (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL;
(44)
where
qPH = E [eqH j eqH < D] :
It follows from di¤erentiation of (44) and the relations in (35), (37) and (42) that:
@i(si)
@pi
=
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)

qPH
 
1  NP 
+

Pr (pj  pij si) +
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
 @ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi

qNPH 
NP
+
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
 
ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
  pi
+ (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL;
so
@i(si)
@pi
=
@ Pr(pjpijsi)
@pi
 
pi   ci
 
si; p
 1
j (pi)
  
qPH
 
1  NP + qNPH NP   qL
+ Pr (pj  pij si) qNPH NP + (1  Pr (pj  pij si)) qL;
which can be simplied to (27), because qH = qPH
 
1  NP + qNPH NP .
Proof. (Proposition 8) The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. (Proposition 9) First we note that  (s; sj) = f (s) f (sj) for inde-
pendent signals, so the inequality
d
ds
 R s
x
f (s) f (sj) dsjq
NP
H 
NP + qL
R x
s
f (s) f (sj) dsj
f (s) f (x)
!
=
d
ds
 R s
x
f (sj) dsjq
NP
H 
NP + qL
R x
s
f (sj) dsj
f (x)
!
= 0  0
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is satised. Thus, it follows from Proposition 8 that the global second-order con-
dition is satised. Moreover, for independent signals, we have from Denition 6
that
~H (s) =
f (s) (qH   qL)R s
s
f (sj) dsjqNPH 
NP +
R s
s
f (sj) dsjqL
(45)
=   d
ds
ln
Z s
s
f (sj) dsjq
NP
H 
NP +
Z s
s
f (sj) dsjqL

(qH   qL)
qNPH 
NP   qL ;
Thus, (28) can be written as in (30).
In case costs are almost surely common knowledge, so that dc(v;v)
dv
& 0 for
v < s, (30) can be simplied to (31) as follows:
p (s) = c (s; s) +

qL
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
dv
= c (s; s) +

qL
((1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL)
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
(p  c (s; s)) ;
where F (s) is the marginal probability distribution.
Ranking of auction formats
Proof. (Proposition 10)
When costs are almost surely common knowledge, in a uniform-price auction
we have that:
i (s) = E [pj   c (s; s)j pj  pi] Pr (pj  pij s) qPH
 
1  NP 
+ (pi (s)  c (s; s)) Pr (pj  pij s) qNPH NP
+ (pi (s)  c (s; s)) (1  Pr (pj  pij s)) qL;
Independent cost information yields:
i (s) = E [pj   c (s; s)j pj  pi] (1  F (s)) qPH
 
1  NP 
+ (pi (s)  c (s; s)) (1  F (s)) qNPH NP
+ (pi (si)  c (s; s))F (s) qL:
(46)
We have from (31) that:
E [pj   c (s; s)j pj  pi] (1  F (s))
(p  c (s; s))
=
Z s
s

qL
((1  F (sj)) qNPH NP + F (sj) qL)
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
dsj
=
Z s
s
  
(1  F (sj)) qNPH NP + F (sj) qL

qL
!  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
dsj
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We make the substitution u = F (sj) and use that  = F 0 (sj), so
=
Z 1
F
  
(1  u) qNPH NP + uqL

qL
!  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
du
=
266664

((1 u)qNPH NP+uqL)
qL
1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL

1  (qH qL)
qNPH 
NP qL

( qNPH NP+qL)
qL

377775
1
F
=
1
1  (qH qL)
qNPH 
NP qL
 qNPH NP+qL
qL
  

((1 F )qNPH NP+FqL)
qL
1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL

1  (qH qL)
qNPH 
NP qL
 qNPH NP+qL
qL

=
qL
(qH   qNPH NP )
0B@1   (1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
qL
!1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
1CA
=
qL
qPH (1  NP )
0B@1   (1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
qL
!1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
1CA ;
because qH = qNPH 
NP + qPH
 
1  NP . We substitute this result and (31) into
(44), which yields:
i(s)
p c(s;s) = qL
0@1  ((1 F )qNPH NP+FqL)
qL
1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
1A
+

qL
((1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL)
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP
+

qL
((1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL)
 (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
F (s) qL
= qL
0@1  ((1 F )qNPH NP+FqL)
qL
1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
1A
+q
(qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
L
  
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
1  (qH qL)
qNP
H
NP qL
= qL:
because qH = qNPH 
NP + qPH
 
1  NP .
Next we derive the same result for the discriminatory auction. It follows from
(7) and (16) that
 (s) = (p (s)  c (s; s)) (1  F (s)) qH + (p (s)  c (s; s))F (s) qL
= qL (p  c (s; s)) :
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Proof. (Proposition 11) It follows from (44) that the expected revenue of
a producer in a uniform price auction after observing the signal s is:
Ru (s) =
R s
s p(sj)(s;sj)dsjq
P
H(1 NP )+
R s
s p(s)(s;sj)dsjq
NP
H 
NP+
R s
s p(s)(s;sj)dsjqLR s
s (s;sj)dsj
=
R s
s

c(sj ;sj)+
R s
sj
dc(v;v)
dv
e
  R vsj eH(u)dudv

(s;sj)dsjq
P
H(1 NP )R s
s (s;sj)dsj
+
R s
s

c(s;s)+
R s
s
dc(v;v)
dv
e 
R v
s
eH(u)dudv (s;sj)dsqNPH NPR s
s (s;sj)dsj
+
R s
s

c(s;s)+
R s
s
dc(v;v)
dv
e 
R v
s
eH(u)dudv (s;sj)dsjqLR s
s (s;sj)dsj
:
(47)
Let
u (s) =
R s
s
R s
sj
dc(v;v)
dv
e
  R vsj eH(u)dudv (s; sj) dsjqPH  1  NP 
+
R s
s
R s
s
dc(v;v)
dv
e 
R v
s
eH(u)dudv (s;sj)dsjqNPH NPR s
s (s;sj)dsj
+
R s
s
R s
s
dc(v;v)
dv
 R s
s (s;u)duR v
s (v;u)du
 (qH qL)
qL
dv (s; sj) dsjqL:
We can change the order of integration as follows:
u (s) =
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
Z v
s
e
  R vsj eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdvqPH  1  NP 
+
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s
e 
R v
s
eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdv qNPH NP
+
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s
e 
R v
s
eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdvqL:
Assume now that dc(v;v)
dv
is zero for v below w  s. In this case, we have:
u (s) =
Z s
w
dc (v; v)
dv
Z v
s
e
  R vsj eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdvqPH  1  NP 
+
Z s
w
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s
e 
R v
s
eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdv qNPH NP
+
Z s
w
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s
e 
R v
s
eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjdvqL;
so that
du (s)
dw
=  dc (w;w)
dw
Z w
s
e
  R wsj eH(u)du (s; sj) dsjqPH  1  NP 
 dc (w;w)
dw
e 
R w
s
eH(u)duZ s
s
 (s; sj) dsjqL +
Z s
s
 (s; sj) dsjq
NP
H 
NP

;
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if w  s. Obviously, du(s)
dw
= 0 if w < s. Now, we use that signals are independent,
so  (s; sj) = f (s) f (sj) and it follows from (45) that
eH (s) =   d
ds
ln
 
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
 (qH   qL)
qNPH 
NP   qLZ w
s
eH (u) du = "(qH   qL) ln  (1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
qL   qNPH NP
#w
s
=
(qH   qL) ln

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL

qL   qNPH NP
e 
R w
s
eH(u)du =

(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
(1  F (s)) qNPH NP + F (s) qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
:
Next, we use the above expressions and that  (s; sj) = f (s) f (sj), so
du(s)
dw
=  dc(w;w)
dw
R w
s

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (sj))qNPH NP+F (sj)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) f (sj) dsjq
P
H
 
1  NP 
 dc(w;w)
dw
R s
s

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) f (sj) dsjq
NP
H 
NP
 dc(w;w)
dw
R s
s

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) f (sj) dsjqL:
(48)
Thus, du(s)
dw
can be simplied as follows:
du(s)
dw
=  dc(w;w)
dw
R F (w)
F (s)

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F )qNPH NP+FqL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) dFqPH
 
1  NP 
 dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) (1  F (s)) qNPH NP
 dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s)F (s) qL:
The rst integral can be solved as follows:
Z F (w)
F (s)

(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
(1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
dF
=
 
(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
Z F (w)
F (s)
 
(1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
 (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP dF
=
 
(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
264 (1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
(qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
+1
(qH   qNPH NP )
375
F (w)
F (s)
=
 
(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
264 (1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
(qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
+1
qPH (1  NP )
375
F (w)
F (s)
;
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because qH = qNPH 
NP +qPH
 
1  NP . Using this integral, we can simplify du(s)
dw
as follows:
du(s)
dw
=  dc(w;w)
dw
 
(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s)" 
(1  F ) qNPH NP + FqL
 (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP
+1
#F (w)
F (s)
 dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s) (1  F (s)) qNPH NP
 dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qNPH NP+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qNPH NP+F (s)qL
  (qH qL)
qL qNPH NP f (s)F (s) qL
=  dc(w;w)
dw
 
(1  F (w)) qNPH NP + F (w) qL

f (s) :
(49)
Next, we make the corresponding calculation for the discriminatory auction.
The expected revenue in a discriminatory auction is:
Rd (s) =
R s
s p(s)(s;sj)dsjqH+
R s
s p(s)(s;sj)dsjqLR s
s (s;sj)dsj
=
R s
s c(s;s)(s;sj)qHdsj+
R s
s c(s;s)(s;sj)qLdsj+d(s)R s
s (s;sj)dsj
:
(50)
We have independent signals, so it follows from Proposition 2 that
d (s) =
Z s
s
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

dvf (s) f (sj) dsjqH
+
Z s
s
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

dvf (s) f (sj) dsjqL:
As for the uniform-price auction, we change the order of integration:
d (s) =
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjdvqH
+
Z s
s
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjdvqL:
Next, we assume that dc(v;v)
dv
is zero for v below w  s. In this case, we have:
d (s) =
Z s
w
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjdvqH
+
Z s
w
dc (v; v)
dv
Z s
s

(1  F (v)) qH + F (v) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjdvqL;
so that
dd (s)
dw
=  dc (w;w)
dw
Z s
s

(1  F (w)) qH + F (w) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjqH
 dc (w;w)
dw
Z s
s

(1  F (w)) qH + F (w) qL
(1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL

f (s) f (sj) dsjqL;
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if w  s. Obviously, dd(s)
dw
= 0 if w < s.
dd(s)
dw
=  dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qH+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qH+F (s)qL

f (s) (1  F (s)) qH
 dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qH+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qH+F (s)qL

f (s)F (s) qL:
if w  s. Next we use that  is a constant.
dd(s)
dw
=  dc(w;w)
dw

(1 F (w))qH+F (w)qL
(1 F (s))qH+F (s)qL

f (s) ((1  F (s)) qH + F (s) qL)
=  dc(w;w)
dw
((1  F (w)) qH + F (w) qL) f (s) :
(51)
Thus, it follows from (49) and (51) that dd(s)
dw
 du(s)
dw
, which also implies
that dRd(s)
dw
 dRu(s)
dw
. We have from Proposition 11 that Rd  Ru for w = s when
the signals are independent. Thus, we can conclude that Rd  Ru for w  s and
independent signals. By comparing (48) and (51), we can also deduce that Ru
decreases, and accordingly Rd Ru increases, when qNPH NP decreases for a xed
qH .
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